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NEARLY A DECADE LATER: REVISITING
GUSTAFSON AND THE STATUS OF SECTION
12(A)(2) LIABILITY IN THE COURTSCREATIVE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND A
PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Natasha S. Guinan*
INTRODUCTION

In 1995 the Supreme Court determined in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.'
that rescissionary liability under the 1933 Federal Securities Act (the
"'33 Act") 2 no longer applied to private or aftermarket securities
transactions, but only to public securities transactions. Because
rescissionary liability 3 traditionally received broad application under
the '33 Act, Gustafson represented a policy choice by the Court to
limit the number of securities lawsuits at the expense of consumer
protection.
The Gustafson decision, although popular with
defendants, has been roundly criticized by academics and the
securities bar alike, not only for its policy-driven result but also for its
strained and illogical reading of the '33 Act.4
Gustafson left the lower courts with the difficult task of determining
on a case-by-case basis whether a given offering of securities was
public-and therefore subject to potential Section 12(a)(2) liability 5or private and therefore immune from Section 12(a)(2) liability. The
lower courts have at times crafted creative solutions in their attempt
to enable plaintiffs to recover rescissionary damages despite
Gustafson. This Note closely examines one of these solutions, the
"quasi-public" offering. This Note argues that although the quasi* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law; Ph.D., 2003, McGill
University. I would like to thank Professor Jill Fisch for her help with this paper and
Professor James Jalil for inspiring my interest in securities law. Finally, I thank my
family, especially my husband Matthew Linck, for all their love and support.
1. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77z-3 (2000).
3. In this context, rescissionary liability means that a purchaser may "recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if [the
purchaser] no longer owns the security." 15 U.S.C. § 771 (a) (2000).
4. See infra Part I.C.2. and Part I.C.3.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
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public argument is both an interesting and creative solution to limited
rescissionary recovery under Gustafson, it is an inadequate approach
that both (1) undermines long-standing securities law that has been
incorporated into the complex interrelated web of securities
regulations that distinguish public transactions from private
transactions, and (2) creates an unpredictable source of liability for
issuers of securities that should be able to structure securities
placements with foreknowledge of what liabilities could result.
Since the Gustafson opinion has already been written on
extensively,6 Part I offers only a brief description of Gustafson. Part II
then examines the quasi-public argument, which is adopted by some
lower courts post-Gustafson but rejected by other lower courts. Part
III provides a critique of the quasi-public argument and support for
those courts that reject this argument. Part III also offers an
alternative proposal that would enable private securities purchasers to
recover rescissionary damages post-Gustafson. This proposal does not
make the applicability of Section 12(a)(2) liability dependent on
exemptions from Section 5 registration requirements. 7 Rather, this
solution is based on a broader understanding of a prospectus, which
includes informal information that is not required to be disclosed
under either Sections 5 or 10 of the '33 Act. This Note suggests that
where such informal information is held out to the unsophisticated
investing public and proves to be materially misleading, that
information should be construed as a "prospectus"-broadly
understood-and subjected to Section 12(a)(2) liability.
The proposal developed in this Note would prevent private sellers
of securities from avoiding rescissionary liability by calling
information that amounts to a solicitation to the unsophisticated
investing public something other than a prospectus. Moreover, this
proposal preserves some of the spirit of Gustafson by neither
extending the scope of Section 12(a)(2) liability to aftermarket
securities sales, nor making all private securities placements
vulnerable to rescissionary liability-just those that hold fraudulent
and misleading information out to the unsophisticated investing
public.
I. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT OF A PROSPECTUS FOR PUBLIC
OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES

Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman. -Justice Brandeis8
6.
7.
8.
Social

See infra note 46.
15 U.S.C. § 77e.
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission & Corporate
Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1212 (1999) (quoting Richard M.
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Part I first examines the historical background of the Federal
Securities Act of 1933 and its purpose as an act of consumer
protection. 9 It then explains how the registration statement and the
prospectus function in securities law.' ° Finally, this part summarizes13
the majority" and dissenting 12 opinions in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
14
and provides a brief account of typical critical responses to the case.

A. A Brief HistoricalBackground
The Federal Securities Act of 1933 was, in part, adopted as a
congressional response to the stock market collapse of 1929 and the
ensuing Great Depression."' The '33 Act both defines and regulates
what information issuers involved in the public distribution of
securities must disclose. Arguably, the '33 Act 6 has accomplished its

express aim of public disclosure, since "[o]ther nations justifiably seek
to implement the liquidity, transparency, integrity, and investor
protection... that embody [U.S.] securities markets. Relatively
efficient trading markets are based on a disclosure regime where
transactions are expeditiously executed and competitively priced."' 7
The disclosure requirements of the '33 Act provide for consumer

protection 8 by requiring that specific information-including
industry-sensitive information and risk factors that make an offering
speculative-about

an issuing company be

made public in a

prospectus when that company issues securities for sale to the public. 19
As Cynthia Williams observes, "Congress adopted mandatory
disclosure in the federal securities laws to advance a number of
distinct purposes. One of the major purposes of disclosure was to
Abrams, Introduction to Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the
Bankers Use It 62 (1967)).
9. See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
13. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
14. See infra notes 99-132 and accompanying text.
15. See James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 3-4 (3d
ed. 2001); see also Hillary A. Sale, DisappearingWithout a Trace: Sections 11 and
12(A)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 429, 433 (2000) ("In response to
the market crash of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities Act as its first attempt to
create federal duties for the registration and disclosure of information in connection
with securities offerings .... (citation omitted)).
16. In conjunction with the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which, among other
things, created the Securities and Exchange Commission, the '33 Act provides for
public disclosure for consumer protection purposes.
17. Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws:
Good for the Economy?, 55 SMU L. Rev. 347, 347 (2002) (citation omitted).
18. Whether the disclosure requirements of the '33 Act provide adequate
consumer protection is a question addressed in Part III of this Note.
19. Cheryl V. Reicin et al., An Insider's Guide to Going Public: A Guide to the
Initial Offering Process and Life as a Public Company 30 (2002).
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prevent fraud by corporate issuers and underwriters in the initial sale
and subsequent trading of securities. "2' The '33 Act adds teeth to its
mandatory disclosure requirements by making issuers who fail to
comply with its requirements (for fraudulent or other reasons) liable."
For instance, Section 12(a)(2) of the '33 Act makes full rescissionary
damages available to purchasers of securities if the prospectus for the
securities contains a material omission and/or misstatement. Thus,
Section 12(a)(2) provides a very broad remedy for defrauded
purchasers of securities.22
B. The Registration Statement and the Prospectus
Section 5 of the '33 Act mandates that unless a security is sold
pursuant to an exemption,2 3 the issuer must file a registration
statement in order to lawfully offer or sell a security. Section 5 states
that
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it
shall be unlawful for any person, 24 directly or indirectly...
to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of
any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless
a
25
registration statement has been filed as to such security.
A registration statement involves the production of a prospectus that
must accompany all written offers to purchase publicly offered
securities, and, at minimum, conform to the requirements for a
prospectus that are listed in Section 10 of the '33 Act.2 6 Section 10
20. Williams, supra note 8, at 1209-10 (citations omitted).
21. See Section 12(1) of the '33 Act, which provides rescissionary damages for
investors if an issuer violates registration or gun-jumping requirements, 15 U.S.C. §
771(a)(1), Section 11 of the '33 Act, which creates liability for fraudulent registration
statements, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, Section 15, which permits investors to recover on a joint
and several basis from persons who "control" any person liable under Sections 11 or
12, 15 U.S.C. § 77o, and, the SEC itself can seek penalties and civil injunctions for
violations of the '33 Act accomplished by false or misleading methods, 15 U.S.C. §
77q, 77t(b), (d).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 771.
Any person who.., offers or sells a security.., which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading... shall be
liable... to the person purchasing such security from him... to recover

the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon.
Id.; see also Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 Emory L.J. 95, 95-96 (1996).
23. There are numerous securities transactions that are exempt or "safe
harbored" from the registration requirements of the '33 Act, including those covered
by Section 3, Section 4, and various SEC safe harbors.
24. The '33 Act defines "person" broadly as "an individual, a corporation, a
partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated
organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)-(c).
26. See id. § 77j.
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empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to
determine which information contained in the registration statement
must be included in the prospectus, and therefore enables the SEC to
control the contents of a prospectus in a registered offering. In
relevant part, Section 5 states: "It shall be unlawful for any person...
to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any security with
respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this
subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of [Section
10]." 27
Typically, a prospectus contains most of the information that issuers
are required to provide in the detailed registration statement they file
with the SEC.28 However, parts of the prospectus must be written in
plain English pursuant to Rule 421(d)2 9 so that public purchasers can
easily comprehend the detailed information it contains. 0 The type of
information contained in a registration statement is extensive and
encompasses all aspects of the issuer's business. For example, a
registration statement will contain comprehensive
financial
information, certified financial statements, a detailed description of
the rights and privileges of the offered security, management's review
of the issuer's capital needs, solvency, and financial needs, and
descriptions of the particular risk factors associated with this
offering.3 1
A prospectus, then, must contain all the relevant material
information contained in a registration statement that a prospective
investor would need to assess fully the risks and benefits involved in
purchasing a security.
The Supreme Court defined "material
information" in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,32 where it
found that "material information" is fact-specific, and dependent on
whether a reasonable investor would find it significant if such
information were withheld or misrepresented.33
Ideally, if a
27. Id. § 77e(b)(1).
28. See id. § 77g ("Information Required in Registration Statement"); see also
Cox, supra note 15, at 237 (stating that a registration statement must contain
"information bearing on the registrant, information about the distribution and use of
its proceeds, a description of the securities of the registrant, and various exhibits....
Only ... the first three categories must be reproduced in the prospectus.").
29. Alan R. Palmiter, Securities Regulation: Examples & Explanations93 (2d ed.
2002). The parts of a prospectus that must be written in plain English include the
cover pages, summary, and risk factors.
30. See SEC, A Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure
Documents (1998) (describing the SEC plain English standards), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/plaine.pdf.
31. See Reicin et al., supra note 19, at 30.
32. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
33. Id. at 449. The context of the TSC Industries decision was a proxy solicitation,
but in 1988 the Supreme Court applied this same definition of material information in
a different securities context that involved merger discussions. See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Therefore, it appears to be well-settled law that
material information in connection with an offering of securities means information
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prospectus contained all relevant material information that a
reasonable investor would require to fairly assess the purchase price
of a security, then the prospectus would place an individual public
investor on nearly equal footing with the issuer of the security-at
least in terms of their respective abilities to analyze the purchase
price.
Every registered offering of securities-that is, every offering that
requires a registration statement pursuant to Section 5 of the '33
Act-must have a prospectus that, at minimum, meets the
requirements of Section 10." However, Section 2-the definitional
section of the '33 Act-actually defines a "prospectus" much more
expansively than does Section 10. Section 2 states that a prospectus is
"any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter or
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."3 5
Even though every registered offering of securities requires a
prospectus that, at minimum, conforms to Section 10 requirements,
not every offering of securities needs to be registered. There are
many exemptions, 36 and, therefore, not every offering of securities
requires a prospectus that meets the rigorous requirements of Section
10.
However, even unregistered securities offerings have a
"prospectus" in the sense intended by Section 2 of the '33 Act because
such offerings will have some sort of sales document, consisting of
either a written or oral communication, offering unregistered
37
securities for sale or confirming the sale of that security.
Prior to Gustafson, there was little question that references in the
'33 Act to a "prospectus" included both the broad meaning contained
in Section 2, which incorporates even non-registered non-public
offerings of securities, and the narrower meaning of a prospectus
created for a registered offering pursuant to Section 10.38 Under this
that a reasonable investor would find significant were it withheld or misrepresented to
them.
34. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000).
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings,
1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 31-32 ("As explained by the Supreme Court, no
registration is needed for investors who are 'able to fend for themselves' and thus
contract for informational and veracity commitments."); see also id. at 11 ("Those
who can 'fend for themselves,' the Securities Act supposes, will replicate regulatory
protections privately through the contracting process and reliance on background
antifraud standards.").
38. See, e.g., Pac. Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., Inc., 993 F.2d 578 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that Section 12(2) applies to private placements), cert. granted,510
U.S. 1083 (1994), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1160 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983
F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993); Haralson v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 919 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990); Phar-Mor, Inc., v. County Natwest Global
Sec., Ltd., 848 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1993). Before 1995, circuit courts uniformly held
that 12(a)(2) liability attached to both public offering of securities and private
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rationale, it followed that Section 12(a)(2) liability,3 9 which can attach
to a seller of a security who sells securities by means of a fraudulent
"prospectus or oral communication,"4 applied to public and private
transactions, as well as aftermarket trading. 41 However, the Court's
1995 Gustafson decision determined-contrary to nearly fifty years of
precedent 2 -that Section 12(a)(2) 43 liability no longer applied to

either private transactions or aftermarket transactions."

At the risk

of understating the reaction the Gustafson decision provoked, it is fair
to say that its holding "came as something of a surprise"4 5 to both
academics and the securities bar.
C. The Gustafson Decision

Numerous commentators have written extensively about the

Gustafson decision.46 This section briefly summarizes the rationale of

transactions or aftermarket trading-even when the lower courts were deciding
otherwise. There was, however, one academic voice before 1995 that maintained
12(a)(2) liability should not attach to trading transactions, private offerings, or any
securities transaction exempt pursuant to Section 4 of the '33 Act, and this voice was
Professor Weiss. See Elliot J. Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section
12(2) Applies only to Public Offerings, 48 Bus. Law. 1 (1992); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. Law.
1231, 1231 (1995) ("Professor Weiss contended [several years ago] that liability under
section 12(2) arose only with respect to public offerings of securities ....
At that
time, Weiss' iconoclastic view had some support in the case law, but essentially no
support in the academic commentary." (citation omitted)); Peter V. Letsou, supra
note 22, 98 & n.17 ("From 1947... until 1995 ... the proposition that §12(2) applied
to private transactions was accepted almost without question... Professor Weiss was
the exception.").
39. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
41. Aftermarket trading means trading by investors who are able to "fend for
themselves" without '33 Act protections. This meaning is consistent with the
definition provided by SEC. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) ("An
offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not
involving any public offering."').
42. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
44. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995).
45. Letsou, supra note 22, at 98 n.17 (citing Therese Maynard, The Future of
Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 Ala. L. Rev. 817, 869 (1994)).
46. A sampling of the titles of articles written in the immediate aftermath of
Gustafson illustrates the outpouring of academic commentary this Supreme Court
decision inspired. See, e.g., Laura K. Bancroft, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The
Continued Shrinking of Private-PlaintiffRemedies Under the 1933 Securities Act, 27
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 149 (1995); Krista R. Bowen, A Cloudy Prospectus: The Supreme
Court's Problematic Reasoning in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1041 (1996); Christie L. Gamble, Gustafson v. Alloyd: Setting Limits on a Potentially
Powerful Weapon, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 489 (1996); Therese Maynard, A Requiem:
Reflections on Gustafson, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 1327 (1996); J. Dormer Stephen III,
Gustafson: One Small Step (Backward) for Private Plaintiffs, One Giant Leap
(Backward) for the Securities Bar, 49 Okla. L. Rev. 425 (1996); Elliott J. Weiss, Some
FurtherThoughts on Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 137 (1996).
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the Gustafson Court and the dissenting opinions. This section
concludes with a discussion of typical critical responses to the
controversial decision.
1. The Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision, the Gustafson Court addressed the issue of
whether investors who purchased all of Alloyd Company's
outstanding shares from defendants, controlling shareholders of
Alloyd, in a private written contract of sale agreement could seek
rescission of the contract under Section 12(a)(2). 47 As Justice
Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion, the question presented was
"whether this right of rescission extends to a private, secondary
transaction, on the theory that recitations in the purchase agreement
are part of a 'prospectus. ' ' 48 The privately negotiated stock purchase
agreement in Gustafson included representations and warranties
concerning the financial condition of Alloyd that, after a year-end
audit, proved untrue. 49 The plaintiff-purchasers were entitled to a
price adjustment under the express representations and warranties
contained in their stock purchase agreement,5 0 but instead claimed
that the contract of sale was a prospectus and sought full rescission
under Section 12(a)(2) for misstatements contained in the stock
purchase agreement. 1 The difference between the price adjustment
and rescissionary damages amounted to nearly $20 million.52 The
critical question in this case, therefore, was whether the stock
purchase agreement between Gustafson and Alloyd was a prospectus
47. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 564-66.
48. Id. at 564.
49. Plaintiff-purchasers in Gustafson agreed to pay $18,709,000 in the initial sale
of stock and an additional $2,122,219 to reflect the estimated net worth increase in
Alloyd Corp. from the end of the previous year-the last year financial data was
available-to present. Id. at 565. In total, plaintiff-purchasers agreed to buy nearly
all the outstanding stock in the closely held Alloyd Corp. from its three controlling
shareholders-Gustafson, McLean and Butler-for approximately $21 million, and
plaintiff-purchasers did so through their newly formed corporation, Alloyd Holdings,
Inc. Id. at 565-66. The stock purchase agreement included seller's representations and
warranties that (i) the company's financial statements fairly stated its financial
condition and that (ii) during the time between the last balance sheet and the
privately negotiated stock purchase agreement, no material adverse change had
occurred in Alloyd's financials. Id. at 565. Moreover, the stock purchase agreement
contained the following warranty: "if the year-end audit and financial statements
revealed a variance between estimated and actual increased value, the disappointed
party would receive an adjustment." Id. After the end of the fiscal year, Alloyd's
audit revealed that plaintiffs had the contractual right to recover an $815,000 priceadjustment from sellers pursuant to the stock purchase agreement, but plaintiffs
instead sought rescission of the agreement pursuant to Section 12(2) of the '33 Act.
Id. Indeed, even after defendants actually remitted the $815,000 price-adjustment to
plaintiffs, plaintiffs continued with their 12(a)(2) lawsuit. Id. at 566.
50. See supra note 49.
51. See supra note 49.
52. See supra note 49.

2004]

REVISITING GUSTAFSON

1061

within the meaning of Section 12(a)(2) of the '33 Act.53 The majority
in Gustafson concluded that it was not.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion focused on definitions of the
term "prospectus" found in the '33 Act in Sections 2(10), 10, and
12(a)(2).54 Justice Kennedy wrote that, where possible, the term
"prospectus" "should be construed ... to give it a consistent meaning
throughout the Act ... [because of] our duty to construe statutes, not
isolated provisions."5 5 Rather than begin at the beginning of the Act
with Section 2, however, Justice Kennedy's opinion first analyzed the
meaning of a prospectus under Section 10.56 Section 10 does not
define the term "prospectus" per se, but requires that a prospectus
provide requisite registration statement information unless an
exemption obtains.57
On the basis of Section 10, the Gustafson Court reasoned that this
section provides a negative definition of what a prospectus cannot be
if the term "prospectus" is to be treated uniformly throughout the '33
Act 5 8-namely, anything other than a document relating to a public
offering by an issuer which requires a registration statement:
[W]hatever else "prospectus" may mean, the term is confined to a
document that, absent an overriding exemption, must include the
"information contained in the registration statement." By and large,
only public offerings by an issuer of a security, or by controlling
shareholders of an issuer,
require the preparation and filing of
59
registration statements.
Since the Gustafson majority began with Section 10 rather than
Section 2, the decision effectively reasoned backward:6 since, by
definition, a prospectus within the meaning of Section 10 must include
registration statement information, and because only public offerings
require a registration statement, then according to the Court, a
prospectus can only relate to public offerings of securities. That is,
53. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 570.
54. Id. at 568.
55. Id. (citing Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) and Kokoszka v.
Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974)). This hermeneutic principle of construing the term as
having the same meaning throughout the whole of the '33 Act received particularly
harsh treatment in Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, examined infra.
56. Id.

57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2000); Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
58. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569 (stating that Section 10 "instruct[s] us [as to] what a
prospectus cannot be if the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme.., in which the operative words have a consistent meaning
throughout").

59. Id.
60. See infra note 56 and accompanying text; see also Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 597
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court bypasses § 2(10) .... Instead of beginning at
the beginning, by first attending to the definition section, the Court starts with § 10...
a substantive provision .... The Court then proceeds backward; it reads into the
literally and logically prior definition section, § 2(10), the meaning 'prospectus' has in
§ 10.")).
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rather than looking first to the definitional Section 2 of the '33 Act for
what a prospectus means, the Court used the technical requirements
for a prospectus in a registered offering at Section 10 to establish what
the term "prospectus" means throughout the '33 Act.6 1 Nonetheless,
on this basis Justice Kennedy's majority opinion concluded "a
prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents related to public
offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders."62
The Gustafson Court thus determined that Section 12(a)(2) of the
'33 Act must use the term "prospectus" in the same way that Section
10 does: "We conclude that the term 'prospectus' must have the same
meaning under §§ 10 and 12 . . . [w]e find in § 10 guidance and

instruction for giving the term a consistent meaning throughout the
Act."6 3 On the basis of this equivocation between Sections 10 and

12(a)(2) of the '33 Act, the Gustafson Court concluded that, unless a
written communication offering a security for sale relates to a public
offering by an issuer or its controlling shareholders, a written
communication cannot be a prospectus for Section 12(a)(2)
purposes. 64
The Court bolstered its definition of a "prospectus" for Section
12(a)(2) purposes by looking to the primary purpose behind the '33
Act, which was "the creation of federal duties-for the most part,
registration and disclosure obligations-in connection with public
offerings. '65 On this basis, the Court reasoned that the technical
definition of a prospectus found in Section 10 of the '33 Act cohered
well with the overall aim of the Act to create disclosure and
registration obligations in connection with public offerings. 66 Thus,
the Gustafson majority reasoned that "[a] restrictive interpretation of
the term prospectus better 'linked'
section 12(a)(2) to the duties
67
created by the Securities Act.

The Court's analysis of Section 2(10)-found in the definitional
section of the '33 Act, which chronologically (and logically) precedes
both Sections 10 and 12(a)(2)--opposed Alloyd's contention that
pursuant to Section 2(10) "any written communication that offers a
security for sale is a 'prospectus ' ' 61for Section 12(a)(2) purposes. The
61. This backwards analysis is something that commentators call "mystifying
indeed." Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1236 (citing a Letter from Elliott Weiss to
Stephen M. Bainbridge (Apr. 4, 1995) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University
of Maryland School of Law).
62. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
63. Id. at 570.
64. Id. at 584.
65. Id. at 571-72 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122 &
n. 5 (1953); and H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1933)).
66. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 572-73.
67. Sale, supra note 15, at 459.
68. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 574.
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Gustafson Court criticized Alloyd's reliance on Section 2(10), claiming
that this definitional section of the Act stands in "isolation" from
other uses of the term prospectus throughout the Act. 69 As Justice
Kennedy expressed: "The relevant phrase in the definitional part of
the statute must be read in its entirety, a reading which yields the
interpretation that the term 'prospectus' refers to a document
soliciting the public to acquire securities."7
The Gustafson Court supported its reading of the term
"prospectus" by using the canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, "a
word is known by the company it keeps."'" Using this hermeneutic
principle, the majority reasoned that the broad definition given the
term "prospectus" on the face of Section 2 is actually "inconsistent
with its accompanying words [and would] giv[e] 'unintended breadth
to the [Act]."' 7 2 According to the majority, because all the words
listed in Section 2(10) refer to "documents of wide dissemination,"73
there is support for the fact that when the '33 Act was adopted, a
''prospectus" was already "well understood to refer to a document
soliciting the public to acquire securities from the issuer."74
Leaning on the legislative history of the '33 Act,75 Justice Kennedy
reasoned that a "prospectus" is a term of art and that this convention
explains "what might otherwise be regarded as partial circularity in
the formal, statutory definition. 7 6 Moreover, Justice Kennedy
concluded that although the list of communications enumerated in
Section 2(10) of the '33 Act serves to prevent sellers of securities from
calling a sales document something other than a prospectus in order to
escape liability, this does not mean that any soliciting document is a
prospectus.7 7 Once again, the Court concluded that a prospectus for
purposes of Section 12(a)(2) liability is the same as a prospectus under
Section 10, requiring disclosure and registration requirements in
connection with a public offering, and thereby greatly limiting the
scope of 12(a)(2) liability:
In light of the care that Congress took to justify the imposition of
liability without proof of either fraud or reliance on "those whose
69. "The flaw in Alloyd's argument.., is its reliance on one word of the
definitional section in isolation." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 575.
72. Id. The majority's reasoning is evidently based on the reasoning that the '33
Act was primarily intended to create disclosure and registration requirements in
connection with public offerings of securities.
73. Id. at 575; see also Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1249 (arguing that the list does
not, in fact, exclusively refer to documents of wide dissemination because a letter is an
obvious exception).
74. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 959 (2d ed. 1910)).
75. See id. at 579-84.
76. Id. at 576 (noting that 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) reads, "The term 'prospectus'
means any prospectus.").
77. Id.
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moral responsibility to the public is particularly heavy"-the
"originators of securities"-we cannot conclude that Congress
would have extended that liability
• 78to every private or secondary sale
without a whisper of explanation.
Because the Gustafson majority did not conclude that Congress
intended for Section 12(a)(2) liability to apply to private and
aftermarket sales of securities, the narrow requirements of Section
10-and not the broad definition of Section 2-now govern a limited
form of rescissionary liability under the '33 Act.
2. The Dissenting Opinions
This section will briefly summarize two separate dissents filed by
Justice Thomas79 and Justice Ginsburg in the Gustafson opinion. 0

Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Thomas's dissent began with an
analysis of the definition of a prospectus in Section 2(10) for purposes
of 12(a)(2) liability. Justice Thomas concluded from his analysis that
"the breadth of these terms [in Section 2(10)] forecloses the majority's
position that 'prospectus' applies only in the context of initial
distributions of securities."'" Moreover, Justice Thomas asserted that
the majority opinion's use of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis was not
warranted because the definition provided in Section 2(10) was not
ambiguous on its face and therefore did not require such a canon of
construction: "The majority uses the canon in an effort to create
doubt, not to reduce it."'82
Finally, Justice Thomas's dissent noted that although the majority
was correct to find that neither Sections 5 nor 10 of the '33 Act
embrace the broad definition of a prospectus offered in Section 2, the
term "prospectus" need not be given the same meaning when
"Congress did not use the word 'prospectus' in the same sense
throughout the statute."' 3 Justice Thomas asserted that two distinct
uses of the term "prospectus"-a broad use, such as that found in
Section 2, and a narrow use involving disclosure and registration
requirements, such as that found in Section 10-exist in both the '33
Act itself and in securities practice (where a broad prospectus was
known as an "informal" prospectus and a registration-oriented
prospectus was known as a "formal" prospectus). 4 Moreover, Justice
78. Id. at 582.
79. Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in dissent. See id. at 584-96
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. Justice Breyer joined in dissent. See id. at 596-604 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 585-86.
82. Id. at 586.
83. Id. at 588.
84. Id. at 586-90. As Bainbridge notes:
This argument [of the Gustafson majority] ignores the long-standing
distinction between the broad class of documents known as
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Thomas argued that by including the very word "prospectus" as one

of the types of communication that qualify as a prospectus, Congress
explicitly intended that a prospectus have a broader meaning than

that conveyed by either Sections 5 or 10 of the '33 Act, and that
therefore there must be more than one meaning for the term
"prospectus" in the statute.
Justice Thomas further noted that "[o]n its face, § 12(2) makes none
of the usual distinctions between initial public offerings and
aftermarket trading, or between public trading and privately
negotiated sales. '8 5 Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded, Congress

never intended to limit Section 12(a)(2) liability to prospectuses
pertaining to the disclosure and registration requirements involved in
a public offering: "[O]n this score, § 12(2) is notable for its silence."86

Significantly, Justice Thomas accused the majority of being influenced
by policy preferences, observing that: "[T]he majority's concern [is]
that extending § 12(2) to secondary and private transactions might
result in an unwanted increase in securities litigation."87
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion endorsed Justice Thomas's
statutory analysis,88 but also bolstered his arguments with an analysis
of the drafting history and traditional judicial and academic
interpretations of the '33 Act.89 First, Justice Ginsburg argued that
Congress purposefully adopted a broader definition of the term
"prospectus" when drafting Section 2 of the '33 Act because the
British Companies Act, on which the Securities Act was based,90
contained a narrower definition of a prospectus than that which
Congress adopted in the '33 Act.9' In relevant part, Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion stated that "the drafters of the Securities Act...
prospectuses and the narrower class referred to as 'statutory,' 'formal,'
or 'section 10(a)' prospectuses. With respect to the latter categories, the
qualifying terms are used to identify that sub-group of prospectuses
intended by their drafters to comply with section 10(a). This is part of
the common parlance of securities lawyers, which should have been
familiar to any member of the majority who has taken a securities
regulation course.
Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1237-38 (internal citation omitted).
85. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 589-90.
86. Id. at 590.
87. Id. at 594. This Note returns to the purportedly policy-driven motives behind
the Gustafson decision in Part I.C.3.
88. "As Justice Thomas persuasively demonstrates, the statute's language does
not support the Court's reading. Section 12(2) contains no terms expressly confining
the provision to public offerings, and the statutory definition of 'prospectus'. .. is
capacious." Id. at 596.
89. "Although she joined in Justice Thomas's opinion, she wrote separately to
emphasize her belief that the view of the dissenting justices was also supported by the
drafting history of the 1933 Act itself and by 'the longstanding scholarly and judicial
understanding of section 12(2)."' Letsou, supra note 22, at 108.
90. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 599-600.
91. Id.
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did not import from the British legislation the language limiting
prospectuses to communications 'offering [securities] to the public'
[and] [t]his conspicuous omission suggests that the drafters intended
the defined term 'prospectus' to reach beyond communications used
in public offerings."'92 Second, Justice Ginsburg noted that the House
Conference Report contained no sign that Section 12(a)(2) was to be
limited to public offerings.93 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg emphasized
that the House Conference Report never used the term prospectus,
"even though one would expect that word to figure prominently if it
were the significant limitation the [Gustafson] Court describes."94
Justice Ginsburg further noted that commentators writing shortly
after the '33 Act until 1995 understood that Section 12(a)(2) liability
attaches to resales, private sales, and public offerings.95
Significantly, Justice Ginsburg's dissent highlighted a critical flaw in
the majority's attempt to give the same term the same meaning
throughout the Act.9 6 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg commented that
where a meaning is suitable in one context but not in another, the
former meaning cannot control the latter meaning. 97 Justice Ginsburg
wrote that "[a]ccording 'prospectus' discrete meanings in § 10 and §
12(2) is consistent with Congress' specific instruction in § 2 that
definitions apply 'unless the context otherwise requires."' 98 Thus,
according to Justice Ginsburg's reading, the '33 Act contemplates that
numerous types of communications are prospectuses, but only in
specific contexts of the Act does a prospectus have its narrow meaning
of a document containing the type of information required to be
disclosed in a registration statement in connection with a public
offering of securities.
3. Typical Critical Responses to Gustafson
The academic response to Gustafson was considerable99 and nearly
uniformly negative. The following is typical: "the [Gustafson]
majority issued the most poorly-reasoned, blatantly results-driven
securities opinion in recent memory."' ' Even Professor Elliot Weiss,
who alone, prior to 1995 argued that liability under Section 12(2) was,

92. Id.
93. Id. at 600 (stating that "The House Conference Report, which explains the
Act in its final form, describes § 12(2) in broad terms, and nowhere suggests that the
provision is limited to public offerings" (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess., 26-27 (1933))).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 601-02.
96. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
97. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 597-98; see also Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1236.
98. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 598 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b).
99. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
100. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1231-32.
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in fact, limited to public offerings, 10 1 and therefore agreed with the
Gustafson result, would not endorse the Gustafson opinion. As he

said, "the route the Court took to get [to my position] strikes me, as 0it2
struck the

four dissenting

Justices,

as highly problematic."'

Academic discontent with the Gustafson opinion is not limited to the
fact that on the face of Section 12(a)(2) nothing limits liability for
omissions and misstatements to public offerings, but it is certainly the

touchstone for dissatisfaction with this Supreme Court opinion.
One particular source of academic discontent with the Gustafson

opinion is the Court's reliance on Section 10 for its narrow definition
of what qualifies as a prospectus for the sake of consistency
throughout the Act when Section 2-the definitional sectionexpressly defines a prospectus more broadly at the very outset of the
'33 Act. There is ample support for this assessment on the face of the
'33 Act, which appears to treat numerous documents as prospectuses,

even those documents that need not contain registration statement

information. 1 3 Despite Justice Kennedy's disclaimer that the majority

did not "make the mistake of treating § 10 as a definitional section
[but instead found] in § 10 guidance and instruction for giving the
term a consistent meaning throughout the Act," °4 it nonetheless
appears as though the majority erroneously treated Section 10 as a
definitional section. As Janet Kerr notes:
[T]he Court conceded that Section 10 is not the definitional section
for the term "prospectus," and vigorously denied it was using it in
such a way. Yet regardless of this hollow protestation, the Court's
reliance on this section and upon no other for its interpretation of
the term "prospectus" was demonstrated.0 5

Another source of discontent with the Gustafson opinion among
academic commentators-and one that Justice Ginsburg anticipated

in her dissenting opinion106--is the notion that in order to interpret the
'33 Act as a "coherent regulatory scheme," the majority had to give
101. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102. Elliot J. Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.:
What Questions Remain?, 50 Bus. Law. 1209, 1210 (1995).
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000). Moreover, some documents are exempt
from Section 10, and others, which violate Section 5(b)(1) because of their failure to
comply with Section 10, will be deemed a statutory prospectus.
104. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 570.
105. Janet E. Kerr, Ralston Redux: Determining Which Section 3 Offerings Are
Public Under Section 12(2) After Gustafson, 50 SMU L. Rev. 175, 183 (1996). See
Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1238-39 ("[D]espite Justice Kennedy's protestations to
the contrary, he cannot easily escape being charged with having improperly
substituted section 10 for section 2(10) as the statutory definition of a prospectus ....
By limiting the definition of prospectus to the meaning he believes is contemplated by
section 10, he effectively makes section 10 the working definition of a prospectus.").
106. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 597-98 (noting that "[o]ur decisions.., constantly
recognize that 'a characterization fitting in certain contexts may be unsuitable in
others' (citations omitted)).
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"operative words" in the Act "a consistent meaning throughout. 1 °7
Because the '33 Act, on its face, contemplates different meanings for
the word "prospectus,"'0 8 the Gustafson majority arguably should
have followed a different canon of judicial construction such as that
which Kerr helpfully suggests: "[W]hen a word within a statute has
different meanings, and the meaning in one context is unsuitable in
another, the statutory intent must be honored and the presumption of
uniformity disregarded."1"9
Not only is the canon of judicial construction of applying a
consistent meaning to operative words throughout a statute criticized
by Gustafson commentators, so too is the majority's use of the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Recall that Justice Kennedy appealed to
noscitur a sociis in order to justify the majority's understanding that a
"prospectus" in the '33 Act is a document related to a public offering.
The majority used this doctrine to support its reading of the list of
terms defining a prospectus in Section 2(10), concluding that because
11 a
the list of terms all refer to documents of "wide dissemination,""
prospectus is a widely disseminated selling document made in
connection with a public offering. The majority claimed that Section
2(10) supported the notion that a seller of securities could not escape
liability for a fraudulent or misleading prospectus by claiming that it
was not a prospectus per se but something else, such as a notice or
circular: "The list of terms in § 2(10) prevents a seller of stock from
avoiding liability by calling a soliciting document something other
than a prospectus."'' i However, Bainbridge notes that "it is hornbook
law that noscitur a sociis is merely an aid to interpretation, not a hard
11 2
and fast rule. It must not be used to thwart the legislature's intent.
But the Gustafson majority appears to have indeed thwarted the
legislature's intent by invoking noscitur a sociis to support a narrow
reading of the term "prospectus" as a document related to a public
offering instead of reading it broadly as any written selling device.
'
The majority thereby "let the tail wag the dog."113
Not only did the
Gustafson Court use noscitur a sociis to produce an unintended result,
it also contradicted long-settled securities case law holdings that even
offerings involving few individuals or entities are public if the
purchasers require the protection of the '33 Act because they cannot
fend for themselves. 4 Indeed, as Kerr notes, concluding from Section
107. Id. at 569.
108. Compare the difference between the use of the term "prospectus" in 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b and § 77j.
109. Kerr, supra note 105, at 185.
110. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575.
111. Id. at 576.
112. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1250 (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding that
exemption from registration should turn on whether the class of persons affected
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2(10) that a public communication involves wide dissemination
"directly opposes long-standing authority that public offerings are not
necessarily defined by the number of participants and, thus, neither by
the number of documents disseminated ....The focus on documents
and their dissemination is imperfect, if not wrong altogether.'. 5
On a substantive rather than purely interpretive basis, there are at
least two common criticisms of Gustafson. One relates to the complex
interrelated mechanics of the '33 Act itself and Section 12(a)(2)
liability, and the other involves the purportedly policy-driven basis for
this decision.
First, Section 12(a)(2) liability expressly attaches to Section 3
offerings by referring to: "Any person who.., offers or sells a
security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of [Section
3]). " '6 However, Section 3 offerings are statutorily exempt from the
prospectus requirements of Section 10 in the '33 Act.117 This means
that Congress intended Section 12(a)(2) liability to encompass a
broader meaning than the prospectus requirements of Section 10
alone entail. Further, such a meaning supports the general consensus
that Congress intended 12(a)(2) liability to attach to a broader
understanding of the term "prospectus."'" 8 The Gustafson majority
circumnavigates this difficulty by stating that 12(a)(2) liability attaches
if a Section 10 prospectus is required for the sale of the security, or
"a
would have been required but for a Section 3 exemption:
document is not a prospectus within the meaning of that section [10]
if, absent an exemption, it need not comply with § 10's requirements
in the first place.""' 9 Yet simply by conceding that exemptions exist,
the Gustafson Court implicitly conceded that a prospectus has a
meaning that is not captured by Section 10.
Second, the Gustafson decision was, arguably, a policy-based result,
the express aim of which was to decrease securities litigation by
facilitating fewer lawsuits.2 0 Indeed, the Gustafson majority appears
to admit as much when Justice Kennedy wrote: "We are reluctant to
conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional liabilities that are quite
independent of the new substantive obligations the Act imposes.... It
is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability
for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the

needs the protection of the Act and "[a]n offering to those who are shown to be able
to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public offering"').
115. Kerr, supra note 105, at 188-89.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2000).
117. See id. § 77c.
118. See Kerr, supra note 105, at 186.
119. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 569.
120. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1254 ("Stated most crudely, the policy
preference that seems to run through this opinion is the desire to have fewer
securities lawsuits.").
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secondary market. 12' The Gustafson opinion is not unique in this
regard because in the past decade the22 Supreme Court has both
narrowed and limited securities liability.1
Prior to Gustafson, there had, according to Bainbridge, been "a
substantial upswing.., in the number of cases brought under Section
12(2). ' ' 123 This increase in Section 12 litigation may be attributable to
Supreme Court cases restricting the applicability of 10b-5 liability
under the 1934 Exchange Act,'124 and the Court may have attempted to

frustrate such an upswing in securities lawsuits with Gustafson.125
Indeed, Hillary Sale concedes that "[w]hen Gustafson is applied.., it
eliminates Aftermarket Shareholders, arguably those most likely to

make a claim [making] it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to obtain
their remedies under... 12(a)(2)." 116
The holding in Gustafson has likely forced potential plaintiff-

shareholders who did not purchase in connection with a public
offering to seek remedies for fraud through Section 11 of the '33 Act
and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Exchange Act. However, Section 12(a)(2)
has at least two distinct advantages over these other two remedies.

First, the rescissionary damages available to plaintiffs under Section
12(a)(2) will often be greater than the actual damages available under
either Section 11 or Rule 10b-5. 27 Second, while causation and

reliance are required for an actionable Rule 10b-5 claim and
affirmative defenses as to causation and reliance are available under
a
12 8

Section 11 claim, neither are involved in a Section 12(a)(2) action.
If the policy goal that informed the majority opinion in Gustafson
was to reduce securities lawsuits in general, and Section 12(a)(2) suits
in particular, then it is questionable whether the decision was made
with the integrity of the '33 Act in mind. Indeed, precisely because

the '33 Act is an interrelated and highly technical statute, it is worth
questioning whether courts should, as Bainbridge put it, "make hash

121. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 572, 578.
122. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1252-53. Bainbridge cites Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (overturning an implied private right of action
under Rule 10b-5 for aiding and abetting in the commission of securities fraud), and
Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)
(adopting a short federal common law limitations period for private party claims
under Rule 10b-5)).
123. Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1234.
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. See also Letsou, supra note 22, at 108.
126. Sale, supra note 15, at 483.
127. Id. at 440 ("Section 11(e) allows shareholders to recover damages amounting
to the difference between the amount they paid for the security and the value of the
security at the time of suit or sale not to exceed the offering price. In contrast, section
12(a)(2) shareholders can sue for rescission or, if they no longer hold a security,
damages."). However, Section 12(a)(2)'s privity requirement may be a disadvantage
to plaintiffs who would have no such burden under Section 11 or Rule lOb-5. Id.
128. See Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 1234.
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out of" it, 129 as the Gustafson majority appears to have done, merely
to advance a policy goal. Not only may Gustafson have resulted in
making hash of the '33 Act, it may have actually resulted in more
securities litigation.13 ° Because the majority opinion problematized
whether a particular offering of securities is private or public, such
problems are left for the lower courts to determine at their discretion.
Accordingly, Part II of this Note examines the approaches adopted by
lower courts in the post-Gustafson era.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO GUSTAFSON

[F]ederal regulation applies only to public offerings. For offerings
by an issuer "not involving a public offering," the federal regime
imposes neither mandatory disclosure nor agency review nor even
explicit heightened liability. 131
Part II first describes the challenge presented to lower courts that
must determine the applicability of Section 12 liability postGustafson.132 This part next describes the quasi-public argument,
found in Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd. v. Sapiens InternationalCorp.33
as one avenue for restoring the rescissionary protections of Section 12
to purchasers in ostensibly private offerings. 34 Finally, this part
describes the continuing appeal of the quasi-public argument for the
plaintiffs' securities bar. 35
A. The Courts' Challenge: Applying Gustafson
While academic responses to the Gustafson decision were nearly
uniformly negative, 3 6 the lower courts were nonetheless faced with
the practical challenge of implementing this decision. Applying
Gustafson was-and continues to be-challenging because this
decision makes Section 12 liability turn on whether a given offering
was private or public. Gustafson makes this question, in turn, depend
on the existence of a Section 10-style "prospectus." As one district
court opinion recently expressed:
The Supreme Court's simple conclusion that Section 12(2) applies
only to public offerings does not make the process of determining
what is and is not a public offering any simpler.... The complex
relationship of statutory and regulatory provisions that comprises

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1256.
See infra Part II.
Palmiter, supra note 37, at 11.
See infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
941 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See infra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.3.
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the federal securities laws insures that determining whether an offer
137
is public, in the shadow of Gustafson, is more complex than ever.
Prior to Gustafson, both courts and scholars typically concluded
that buyers in a nonpublic offering could bring suit under section
12(a)(2); indeed, before Gustafson, many opinions where the disputed
offering involved a private placement or an aftermarket purchaser
nonetheless applied Section 12(a)(2) liability.13
However, since
Gustafson, the courts must first determine whether a given offering
was public or private for purposes of Section 12(a)(2) applicability.
Moreover, courts must ascertain what the following somewhat opaque
language from the Gustafson opinion meant: "An examination of § 10
reveals that, whatever else 'prospectus' may mean, the term is
confined to a document that, absent an overriding exemption, must
include the 'information contained in the registration statement."'13 9
Did the Gustafson majority intend "overriding exemption" to include
all terms of the '33 Act that exempt securities from the registration
requirements of Section 5 or just some exemptions, and if so, which
exemptions?
At minimum, it seems clear that the exemptions provided for in
Section 3 of the '33 Act are subject to Section 12(a)(2) liability given
the express statutory language of Section 12 itself: "Any person
who.., offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of [section 3]) ... shall be liable.""14

particular

securities

that

requirements of Section 5.41

are

exempt

from

Section 3 lists

the

registration

The '33 Act also exempts particular

securities transactions in Section 4(2),142 but whether all Section 4(2)
securities transactions are potentially subject to Section 12(a)(2)
liability after Gustafson remains, to this day, an open question.
Indeed, because the Gustafson majority never explicitly made
reference to the exemptions listed in Section 4(2),143 arguably,
"overriding exemption" only includes the Section 3 exemptions.
However, because the Gustafson Court narrowly confined Section
12(a)(2) liability to public offerings and because the "private
placements exempted by section 4(2) by definition do not involve a
public offering, those transactions clearly appear to fall outside

137. Vannest v. Sage, Rutty & Co., 960 F. Supp. 651, 654 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
138. Sale, supra note 15, at 439.
139. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77d, 77e,

77b(11)).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2000).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 77c.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
143. The difference between Section 3 and Section 4 exemptions can be explained
as follows: "The sole difference is that the latter are one-time exemptions, while most
(but not all) of the former are permanent exemptions from registration." Bainbridge,

supra note 38, at 1262.
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section 12(2)'s remaining scope."' 14 Since securities transactions made
pursuant to Section 4(2) are statutorily exempt from registration
under the '33 Act, these securities transactions must be wholly outside
the realm of Section 12(a)(2) liability post-Gustafson. Janet Kerr
observes that "Section 4(2) offerings are excluded from Section
12(2)'s scope for no other reason than by virtue of the Court's 'absent
an overriding exemption' language in Gustafson, which expressly
includes within Section 12(2) only those offerings that are exempted
under Section 3, not Section 4. " 145 If Kerr is correct, then Gustafson
creates an anomalous result because issuers can avoid potential
12(a)(2) liability by structuring offerings of securities pursuant to
Section 4(2) rather than Section 3.
What about offerings made in reliance on something other than
Section 4(2)? It is not clear from the face of the Gustafson opinion
whether ostensibly "private" offerings made on the basis of something
other than Section 4(2) such as Regulation A, Regulation S,or Rule
144A can be subject to Section 12(a)(2) liability. By its silence,
Gustafson left this question for the lower courts to determine on a
case-by-case basis. Over the past eight years the lower courts have
done so in a variety of ways, often reaching the same conclusion for
different reasons, leading to a1 rather
unstable panoply of decisions on
46
various securities transactions.
B. PrivatePlacement or Public Offering? The "Quasi-Public"
Argument
Just one year after Gustafson, a district court in New York
concluded that notes sold pursuant to a Regulation S safe harbor,
which were not subject to Section 5 registration and therefore were
issued without a "prospectus" in the Gustafson sense,'147 nonetheless
constituted a "public offering" for Section 12(a)(2) purposes. In
Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd. v. Sapiens International Corp.,148 the
plaintiff-purchasers bought $750,000 of private debt notes in reliance
on an offering circular that allegedly contained numerous
misrepresentations and omissions.'49 The offering circular in Sloane
"stated that the Notes could be sold either (1) outside the United
States pursuant to an exemption from registration under Regulation S
or (2) to qualified institutional buyers in the United States pursuant to
an exemption under Rule 144A."' 5 °
144.
145.
146.
147.
(2003).
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1264-65.
Kerr, supra note 105, at 190.
See infra Part II.B.
See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-905
941 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 1372.
Id. (citing Decl. of Michael Hammond sworn to on Feb. 21, 1996).
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The plaintiffs in Sloane purchased under Regulation S,"' enabling
defendants to argue that because "Regulation S offerings do not
require a § 10 prospectus to be filed ...the offering is not subject to
suit under § 12(2). ' '152 However, the Sloane court specifically noted
that the Gustafson decision said Section 12(a)(2) liability applied to
offerings involving a Section 10 prospectus unless an overriding
exemption applies.'5 3 The Sloane court expressly relied on the
following language from Gustafson: "[T]he liability imposed by §
12(2) cannot attach unless there is an obligation to distribute the
prospectus in the first place (or unless there is an exemption)."' 54 The
only exemptions that the Sloane court recognized were those found in
Sections 3 and 4 of the '33 Act-not such SEC safe harbors as Rule
144A or Regulation S'155
In this way, the Sloane court found that an offering made pursuant
to Regulation S, which is neither a Section 3 nor a Section 4
exemption, but an SEC safe harbor from registration, may be subject
to Section 12(a)(2) liability "if it is a public offering."' 5 6 Since there is
no obligation to distribute a prospectus in a Regulation S offering
because the registration requirements of Section 5 do not apply, 5 7 it
appears on its face that the offering at issue in Sloane could not be
subject to Section 12(a)(2) liability as a "public" offering at all under
Gustafson. Indeed, even the plaintiff-purchasers in Sloane conceded
there was no "prospectus" per se by virtue of their numerous
references to the "offering circular.' 15 8 Nonetheless, the Sloane court
found that "the wide distribution of the Offering Circular made
Sapiens' Note offering public"'19 and, consequently, the court denied
defendants' motion to dismiss the Section 12(a)(2) claim under
Gustafson. 6°
It would be wholly unclear how the Sloane court reached this
151. There was some dispute in Sloane as to whether plaintiffs had notice of the
restrictions their notes were subject to under Regulation S,as plaintiffs maintained
they did not sign a participation certificate attesting to the purchaser's compliance
with either 144A or Regulation S requirements. See id. at 1373.
152. Id. at 1376.
153. Id.
154. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995).
155. Sloane, 941 F. Supp. at 1376.
156. Id.
157. "The Regulation [S] adopted today is based on a territorial approach to
Section 5 of the Securities Act.... Regulation S relates solely to the applicability of
the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act." See Cox, supra note
15, at 332.
158. Recall that the Section 2(10) definition of a prospectus includes the term
"circular." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000). But the Gustafson Court chose to use
Section 10 (which defines the requisite content for a prospectus in a registered public
offering) in order to establish what the term "prospectus" uniformly meant
throughout the '33 Act.
159. Sloane, 941 F. Supp at 1376.
160. Id. at 1377.
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conclusion save for an instructional footnote, which states that
although Regulation S provides an "escape" from the registration
requirements of the '33 Act, the Regulation S safe harbor is "intended
for use in public offerings [because] [p]rivate transactions are already
exempt under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act. ' 161 Moreover, the Sloane court
noted that defendants neither contended that their offering was
private, nor that purchasers of their debt notes had no need for the
protection of the '33 Act in the Ralston Purinasense.162

Despite the Sloane court's conclusion, it is not clear from the
Gustafson opinion that the only offerings that are private for Section
12 purposes are those exempt through Section 4(2) of the '33 Act. For
example, Gustafson never addressed whether placements made
pursuant to Rule 144A-a safe harbor that facilitates institutional
markets for unregistered placements-were private or public. 63
However, lower courts now routinely hold 144A placements not
subject to Section 12(a)(2) liability under Gustafson1" because 144A
placements require no Section 10-style prospectus and are sold only to
sophisticated QIBs 65 Even the SEC has now stated that although

potential 12(a)(2) liability routinely attached to private offerings such
as Rule 144A placements before Gustafson, "the 'more likely reading'
of Gustafson is that there is no '§ 12(a)(2) liability for the alleged
misstatements in [a] Rule 144A offering memorandum."" 6 6
The Gustafson decision appears to strictly delimit "public offerings"

for Section 12(a)(2) liability purposes to offerings involving a Section
10-type "prospectus" held out to the public for sale of securities by an
issuer or controlling shareholder.'6 7 By holding that an offering
circular that need not conform to Section 10 made a Regulation S
offering "public" because it was "widely circulated," the Sloane court
contradicted not only Gustafson but also long-standing securities
161. Id. at 1376 n.11. Therefore, the Sloane court appears to strictly delimit
"private" offerings of securities to those made pursuant to section 4(2) of the '33 Act.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. There was some dispute in Sloane
as to whether plaintiff-purchasers signed a "certificate of purchase" attesting to their
understanding of the Regulation S and/or Rule 144A requirements for purchase.
163. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(A) (2003).
164. See, e.g., In re Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc. Equity Sec. Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d
1007, 1026 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (determining that a 144A offering memorandum was
not public for Section 12(a)(2) liability purposes); AIG Global Sec. Lending Corp. v.
Banc of America Sec., 254 F. Supp. 2d 373, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that
securities sold pursuant to 144A were not subject to 12(a)(2) liability).
165. "QIBs" are Qualified Institutional Buyers with at least $100 million in assets
and an audited net worth of at least $25 million. See Cox, supra note 15, at 494.
166. In re Hayes, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (citing In re Safety Kleen Corp.
Bondholders Litig., C/A No. 3:00-1145-17 (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2002) (where before
deciding whether there could be section 12(a)(2) liability for a 144A offering, Judge
Andersen solicited the views of the SEC and cited the reply from SEC General
Counsel Becker, dated August 9, 2001 in the opinion)).
167. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995).
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precedent that the size of the offering does not determine whether the
offering is public; rather, the sophistication of the offerees determines
whether an offering is public.168
The Sloane court may have relied on the size of the particular
offering when determining the applicability of Section 12(a)(2)
because when discussing Section 2 of the '33 Act, the Gustafson
majority stated that the listed terms under "prospectus" all refer to
"documents of wide dissemination. '169 However, the Gustafson
decision does not make the number of purchasers to whom a
prospectus is held out critical for determining whether a given offering
is public for Section 12(a)(2) purposes. Rather, Gustafson bases the
determination as to whether an offering is public on the legally
required content of the prospectus for a given offering.17 ° Therefore,
as Kerr noted, the Sloane court's rationale can, without overstating
the case, be said to "fl[y] in the face of well-established authority that
offerings involving only a few individuals (and/or entities) can still be
public."''
Admittedly, it is not clear from the Sloane opinion whether the
purchasers-a corporation organized under British Virgin Island law,
a Delaware Limited Partnership, and an American citizen172-- actually
required the protection of the '33 Act or whether they were
sophisticated purchasers. However, the Sloane court was somewhat
disingenuous to say that defendants never claimed that the plaintiffpurchasers did not require the protection of the '33 Act because the
defendant's offering included a participation certificate that itself
"required a representation that the purchaser was in compliance with
the exemption from registration requirements under either Rule 144A

or Regulation

S.,,173

Such compliance would necessarily involve

purchasers' attestations regarding both sophistication and eligibility to
purchase. Moreover, it seems that, in fact, the plaintiffs in Sloane had
knowledge of the participation certificate,'7 4 which itself typifies the
contractual agreement involved in private securities offerings. The '33
Act presumes that sophisticated purchasers that can fend for
168. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
169. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575.
170. In fact, Gustafson relies on Section 10, not Section 2(10), for its understanding
of what a prospectus is. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
171. Kerr, supra note 105, at 189.
172. Sloane, 941 F. Supp. at 1372.
173. Id. at 1373.
174. "The Declarations tend to show that plaintiffs must have had notice from the
transfer agents and clearing agents that they were required to submit a participation
certificate because the transfer agent had certified that the purchasers had delivered
certificates confirming compliance with Regulation S." Id. There is no indication in
the Sloane opinion that, for example, offers were made to non-QIBs to purchase
pursuant to 144A or that directed selling efforts were made in the United States to
entice purchasers under Regulation S-both of which would constitute obvious
violations of their respective safe harbors.
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C. The Lure of the Quasi-PublicArgument
Despite the shortcomings of the Sloane decision and its quasi-public
argument-that an ostensibly "private" offering in the Gustafson
sense, which does not require a prospectus, can nonetheless become
public for Section 12 liability purposes through wide circulation of its
offering circular-the plaintiffs successfully argued such a position in
that case and thereby overcame the Gustafson policy of limiting
securities liabilities.176 No other decision has directly followed Sloane
on point. l 7 However, the Sloane rationale regarding wide circulation
of private offering sales documents does surface in recent dicta and
continues to offer plaintiff-shareholders an argument (albeit a
frequently unsuccessful one"7 8) with which to try to circumvent
Gustafson.
175. Palmiter, supra note 37, at 11.
176. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
177. The Sloane decision has been cited for a different proposition; namely, that a
sufficient basis for pleading Section 20(a) control person liability under the '33 Act
may be inferred by a defendant's status in a corporation such as an officer or director.
See, e.g., Rich v. Maidstone Fin. Inc., No. 00 CIV. 8100, 2001 WL 286757, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2001) (rejecting the Sloane control person pleading standard); In
re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 661 (E.D. Va. 2000) (using the
same quasi-public standard as Sloane without actually citing to Sloane on point). The
Sloane decision has also been cited for inquiry notice standards where a plaintiff is
deemed to have constructive or inquiry notice when a misrepresentation or omission
should reasonably have been discovered. See, e.g., In re Dreyfus Aggressive Growth
Mut. Fund Litig., No. 98 CIV. 4318, 2000 WL 10211, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2000).
However, the Sloane decision has not been positively cited for the proposition
that the wide circulation of an otherwise private placement offering circular renders
the offering "public" for Section 12(a)(2) purposes.
178. Perhaps owing to both (1) the obvious conflict with SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), which definitively states that a public offering is one
involving purchasers who are not able to fend for themselves, not simply one
involving a large number of offerees or a sizeable offering; and (2) the contradiction
of the rationale of Sloane with the express holding of Gustafson requiring a Section 10
style prospectus. See, e.g., In re Hayes Lemmerz Int'l Inc. Equity Sec. Litig., 271 F.
Supp. 2d 1007, 1028-29 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (rejecting Section 12(a)(2) liability under
Gustafson despite plaintiffs' contention that a private placement memorandum was
"public" owing to its wide dissemination); In re Sterling Foster & Co. Sec. Litig., 222
F. Supp. 2d 216, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that "[c]ourts in this Circuit have
applied the rationale of [Gustafson's] dicta to reach what is now the predominant
conclusion that purchasers in private or secondary market offerings are precluded
from bringing actions under Section 12(a)(2)"); Laser Mortgage Mgmt., Inc. v. Asset
Securitization Corp., No. 00 CIV. 8100, 2001 WL 1029407, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,
2001) (dismissing Section 12(a)(2) claims where plaintiffs never alleged that the
offerings were issued pursuant to a "prospectus" in the Gustafson sense); In re
Musicmaker.com Sec. Litig., No. CVOO-2018 CAS, 2001 WL 34062431, at *15 (C.D.
Cal. June 4, 2001) (dismissing Section 12(a)(2) claims because plaintiffs did not claim
that the offerings at issue were made pursuant to a "prospectus" under Gustafson);
Emergent Cap. Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 615, 622
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For example, in Lewis v. Fresne,'179 although the court ultimately
held that Section 12(a)(2) liability did not attach to a private bridge
loan,18° for which allegedly fraudulent information was both mailed
and conveyed in a phone call, appellant argued before the Fifth
Circuit that "the district court ignored the 'public' aspects of his
transaction. [Appellant] cite[d] to a decision from the Southern
District of New York that allowed a plaintiff to sue under § 12 even

though his purchase of stock was made pursuant to
placement memorandum."' 81 Although the Fifth Circuit
found appellant's "public aspect" argument unconvincing,
did so not on the basis of Gustafson and the crucial
prospectus in establishing a public offering, but on the

a private
ultimately
the court
role of a
following

grounds: "Two of the criteria for determining if a transaction is public

are the size of the offering and the number of offerees.' 18 2 Using
these two criteria, the Fifth Circuit determined that because
respondent's bridge loan involved only one purchaser-appellant-it
was a private offering to which Section 12 liability did not attach.'83
On the basis of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Lewis, it seems clear
that had there been a large number of offerees and a sizeable offering

at stake,

the

purportedly

fraudulent

mailing

and telephone

information would have reached a large number of offerees, as it did
in Sloane, and this could have served as the basis for potential 12(a)(2)
liability. Notwithstanding the Lewis court's disregard for long-

standing Supreme Court precedent regarding how to determine

whether a given offering is public or private, l" the rationale of the
Sloane court could have been used to obtain precisely such a result in
Lewis.
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing Section 12(a)(2) claims where plaintiffs failed to allege
the offerings were issued pursuant to a "prospectus" under Gustafson); Walltree Ltd.
v. ING Furman Selz LLC, 97 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing Section
12(a)(2) claims even though plaintiff argued that debt notes were sold in a 'public
offering' because, inter alia, plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege the offering was
issued pursuant to a "prospectus").
179. 252 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2001).
180. The bridge loan at issue was made in expectation that a private placement of
the company's stock would close; however, the private placement failed, and the icecream company, "Mad Martha's," ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 355-56.
181. Id. at 357 (citing Fisk v. SuperAnnuities, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)). In Fisk, the court held that whether Section 12 liability applies to an offering
that, on its face, comes within a Section 4(2) private placement exemption could not
be determined in pre-trial pleadings because such a question involves a fact-intensive
inquiry. Fisk, 927 F. Supp. at 730. Therefore, the Fisk court never reached the
applicability of Section 12 liability to the placement at issue, in part because the issue
in Fisk was whether the private placement was bona fide; this issue distinguishes Fisk
from both Sloane and Lewis.
182. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 358 (citing Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 842 (S.D.
Cal. 1985)). Koehlerpre-dates Gustafson and is therefore of questionable relevance.
183. Id.
184. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); see also supra note 116
and accompanying text.
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It does not appear likely, however, that courts will readily subscribe
to a Sloane quasi-public argument. Indeed, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York recently rejected a quasi-public
argument by plaintiffs seeking recovery under Section 12(a)(2) in AIG
Global Securities Lending Corp. v. Banc of America Securities LLC 185
In AIG Global, the plaintiffs attempted to color private certificates
purchased pursuant to Rule 144A as part of a "'public style' private
offering[] ."186
Perhaps with Sloane in mind, 8 7 the plaintiffs in AIG Global argued
hypothetically that had defendants sold the same certificates overseas
pursuant to Regulation S instead of Rule 144A, then such a sale
should qualify as a public offering subject to Section 12(a)(2) liability.
The AIG Global court did not mince words when dismissing plaintiffs'
hypothetical quasi-public claim: "There is no legal or factual basis for
calling the ... offerings 'public style private offerings."'188 The AIG
Global court, then underscored that the relevant inquiry under
Gustafson is whether a given offering is a public offering or a private
transaction'89 and certificates sold pursuant to Rule 144A are
"private" for 12(a)(2) purposes.
It is not clear whether a different result would have obtained in
AIG Global had defendants actually structured their placement under
both Rule 144A and Regulation S given the precedent of Sloane.
However, the AIG Global court's language arguably makes such a
different outcome unlikely. After stating that the facts at issue in AIG
Global did not involve a Regulation S placement, the court stated:
"In any event, the Supreme Court made clear in Gustafson [what] the
critical inquiry" is. 9 ° This language appears to rather strongly discount
the quasi-public argument in any event.
Nevertheless, the quasi-public argument that first appeared in
Sloane continues to appeal to the plaintiffs' securities bar, for which
limiting Section 12(a)(2) liability to "public" offerings represents a
lost avenue for recovery in fraudulent private securities placements.
In the wake of recent corporate scandals involving WorldCom, Global
Crossing, and Enron, the plaintiffs' securities bar is working hard to
find ways around Gustafson and other Supreme Court decisions from
185. 254 F. Supp. 2d 373,389 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
186. Id. at 389.
187. It does not appear that plaintiffs in AIG Global cited to Sloane in their
briefs-"[t]hese arguments.., addressed by the plaintiffs, are not supported by any
cases cited by the plaintiffs." Id. Perhaps this was a mere oversight by plaintiffs, given
there was favorable precedent (Sloane) from the same district court, or perhaps this
omission signals the weakness of Sloane's quasi-public argument. In either event,
Sloane was not exactly on point for AIG Global plaintiffs because their Regulation S
argument appears to have been merely hypothetical, whereas in Sloane the notes
were, in fact, placed pursuant to Regulation S.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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the 1990s19' that served to limit plaintiffs' right to recover in securities

lawsuits.192

Indeed, the plaintiff-class in the Enron shareholder litigation is
currently testing the boundaries of Gustafson in its pre-trial motions
by bringing suit under Section 12(a)(2) for, inter alia, securities
purchased pursuant to Rule 144A and Regulation S.193 Plaintiffs in
Newby v. Enron Corp. make explicit reference to Sloane in their
Opposition Brief, 94 arguing that given the scope of the Regulation S
and Rule 144A offerings at issue, these placements should qualify as
public style offerings and therefore be subject to potential Section
12(a)(2) liability: "[D]ue to the widespread solicitation efforts made
in connection with the Enron-related Foreign Debt Securities... the
Court should sustain the § 12(a)(2) allegations as did the Sloane
court." 195
Although there is ample precedent to defeat plaintiffs' arguments in
Newby,196 plaintiff-shareholders today might find a more receptive
judicial audience for arguments that restore plaintiffs' access to such
investor protections of the '33 Act as Section 12(a)(2).1 97 In the wake
of successive corporate scandals over the past three years and
damages wrought on investors-many of which involved pension
funds-the political climate has arguably changed since the time of
Gustafson, when the Supreme Court adhered to a policy of privileging
fewer securities lawsuits at the expense of investor protection. The
Supreme Court might even prove willing to revisit the issue today.
Perhaps there is no better indication that the political climate has
changed than Congress's 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 98 which seeks, among other things, to establish new disclosure
requirements for public companies and provide the SEC with even
greater enforcement powers. However, the failure of Sarbanes-Oxley
to address the issue of rescissionary liability might indicate that the
191. See, e.g., Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (overturning
an implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 for aiding and abetting in the
commission of securities fraud); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (adopting a short federal common law limitations
period for private party claims under Rule 10b-5).
192. See supra note 191.
193. Amended Complaint at 91 1016.2-1016.9, Newby v. Enron Corp., Civil Action
No.
H-01-3624
(S.D.
Tex.
May
14,
2003),
available
at
http://www.enronfraud.com/pdf/MASTERlstAmd.pdf.
194. Lead Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 41-44,
Newby v. Enron Corp., Civil Action No. H-01-3624 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2003).
195. Id. at 42.
196. See, e.g., supra note 180 and accompanying text.
197. The subject of 12(a)(2) applicability and quasi-private offerings in Newby
might serve as an interesting basis of appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which recently, in
dicta, demonstrated its sympathy to such arguments. See Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d
352, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2001).
198. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in sections of 11 U.S.C., 15
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
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political climate has not changed enough to prompt Congress to
revisit the judicially imposed limitations of 12(a)(2) liability in
Gustafson. On one level, this omission is surprising'99 because many
other liability issues pertaining to disclosure requirements were
addressed in that legislation. z° On another level, this omission from
Sarbanes-Oxley is not surprising, given that even the Supreme Court
appears to have misunderstood the mechanics of the '33 Act liability
when deciding Gustafson. Perhaps Congress was insufficiently aware
of how Gustafson limits rescissionary liability for plaintiffshareholders to rectify it through legislation.
As shown in Part II, the quasi-public argument of Sloane is one
approach adopted by the lower courts to reinstate Section 12(a)(2)
liability to securities investors in ostensibly private offerings.
However, the quasi-public argument of Sloane contradicts longstanding securities law that it is the sophistication of purchasers and
not the size of the offering that determines whether an offering is
public. Perhaps for this reason many lower courts have chosen not to
follow the quasi-public rationale of Sloane. Accordingly, Part III of
this Note suggests an alternative to the quasi-public argument of
Sloane, a proposal that restores Section 12(a)(2) liability to a greater
number of investors without contradicting long-standing securities
case law by broadening our understanding of a prospectus while
partially preserving the spirit of Gustafson.
III. THE QUASI-PUBLIC ARGUMENT Is NOT THE RIGHT WAY TO

RESTORE 12(A)(2) INVESTOR PROTECTION TO THE '33 ACT
U.S. securities regulation is mandatory. So goes the refrain. But is
it still true? ... The new reality is that firms, in burgeoning contexts,
can raise investment capital without subjecting themselves to the
Securities and Exchange Commission's... full blown disclosure
requirements or the heightened antifraud standards of the Securities
Act of 1933.201

Part III demonstrates why the quasi-public argument of Sloane is an
inadequate solution for expanding Section 12(a)(2) liability post199. Even the SEC has indicated (as recently as August 2001) that it is at least
"sympathetic to... plaintiffs' argument [that a placement safe-harbored from
registration can be deemed "public"] on policy grounds." In re Hayes Lemmerz Int'l
Inc. Equity Sec. Litig., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1028 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing letters
exchanged between Judge Joseph Anderson and SEC General Counsel Becker in In
re Safety-Kleen Corp. Bondholders Litig., C/A No. 3:00-1145-17 (D.S.C. Mar. 27,
2002) regarding plaintiffs' argument that bonds offered pursuant to Rule 144A should
not be deemed "private" when followed by a registered exchange offer).
200. In particular, these requirements include mandatory CEO/CFO certification
of annual and quarterly reports, the annual auditor assessment of management's
report on accounting and financial controls, and enhanced disclosure of off-balance
debt transactions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2003).
201. Palmiter, supra note 37, at 2-3.
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Gustafson and proposes an alternative solution. First, this part
explains why there is no need to continue to confuse the application of
Section 12(a)(2) liability with public offerings the way both the
Gustafson and Sloane decisions do. 2'
Next, this part argues that
Ralston Purina should remain authoritative when determining
whether a given offering is public or private. 2°3 Finally, this part offers
an alternative to the quasi-public argument, one that would enable
private securities purchasers to recover rescissionary damages postGustafson by broadening our understanding of a prospectus-while
preserving some of the spirit of Gustafson.2 °
A. Why the Quasi-PublicArgument Is an Inadequate Solution
Assuming, arguendo, that expanding Section 12(a)(2) liability to its
pre-Gustafson breadth is desirable,2 5 without overturning Gustafson
altogether, 2 6 the "quasi-public" argument of Sloane is appealing.
However, this argument is not the correct rationale on which to base a
restoration of Section 12(a)(2) investor protection for at least three
reasons: (1) there is no need to continue to confuse the application of
Section 12(a)(2) liability and "public" offerings; (2) the long-standing
Ralston Purina standard should remain authoritative for what
qualifies as a public offering; and (3) there is a simpler, more
predictable way to ascertain whether Section 12(a)(2) should apply.
This Note argues that a simpler way to offer investors greater
protection through easier and more predictable 2 7 access to damages
when they have suffered fraud in an investment is to make Section
12(a)(2) applicable to offerings where issuers hold fraudulent or
misleading information out to the unsophisticated investing public.0 8
1. Confusing the Application of Section 12(a)(2) Liability with the
Existence of a Public Offering of Securities
There is simply no need to continue to confuse the application of
Section 12(a)(2) liability with public offerings as the Gustafson
majority did. As already noted, before Gustafson, it was well settled
that Section 12(a)(2) applied to both private and public offerings.2 9

202. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
205. Because, for instance, rescissionary damages available to plaintiffs under
Section 12 will often be greater than alternative remedies available to them under
either Section 11 of the '33 Act or Rule 10b-5 under the '34 Act. See supra notes 12930.
206. Given that overturning Gustafson altogether seems unlikely to happen.
207. A more predictable way to ascertain whether Section 12(a)(2) should apply
from both the standpoint of purchasers and issuers.
208. See infra Part III.B.
209. Kerr, supra note 105, at 178.
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The Gustafson majority performed a backward and illogical analysis
by using Section 10 rather than Section 2(10) for a working definition
of "prospectus" for Section 12 purposes. 210 The Court should rectify
this problem by acknowledging that the definitional section of the '33
Act is at least relevant for Section 12 purposes, assuming that such
purposes include wide-ranging consumer-shareholder protection.
2. Ralston PurinaShould Remain Authoritative
At the same time, because a "complex relationship of statutory and
regulatory provisions ...comprise[] the federal securities laws, '211 the
Ralston Purina standard should remain authoritative for what12
qualifies as a public offering. As long-standing securities authority
governing whether a given offering qualifies as public, Ralston Purina
has already been integrated into the complex relationship of statutory
and regulatory provisions that constitute the securities laws. For
example, Section 4(2) of the '33 Act, the exempt transactions section,
is based on the concept of sophisticated purchasers who are able to
"fend for themselves" and therefore do not require the registration
protections of Section 5. This concept is borrowed directly from the
Ralston Purina decision.213 Ralston Purina, therefore, has become a
critical basis for understanding the '33 Act, which has itself
incorporated the teachings of Ralston Purina into its complex of
interrelated provisions and regulations. It should remain the standard
for defining the scope of public offerings.
Moreover, given the complex interrelationship of the securities laws
and regulations, it is important to guard against gutting a foundational
concept of the securities laws. This appears to be precisely what the
Sloane court's "quasi-public" argument would accomplish-expanded
investor protection at the expense of the logical coherence of the
securities laws as a whole.
3. The Public-Private Distinction Should Not Control the Application
of Section 12(a)(2) Liability
Finally, the idea that there remains a meaningful difference
between public and private offerings of securities is arguably outdated. Therefore, the applicability of Section 12(a)(2) liability need
not strictly be based on the public-private distinction in an offering of
securities because exemptions from registration should not control
whether the anti-fraud provisions of the '33 Act apply to a given

210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
Vannest v. Sage, Rutty & Co., 960 F. Supp. 651, 654 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
Kerr, supra note 105, at 193-94.
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There is another option detailed in Part III.B.

B. An Alternative Solution: Gustafson and Securities Act Reform
This part proposes a solution that would not make the applicability
of Section 12(a)(2) liability dependent on the availability of
exemptions from Section 5 registration requirements. Instead, this
proposal suggests treating informal information that is already
publicly available to investors 2 5 as part of a "prospectus"-broadly
understood.2 16 Finally, this part proposes that where such informal
information is held out to the unsophisticated investing public and
proves to be materially misleading, such information should 217be
construed as a prospectus for purposes of Section 12(a)(2) liability.
1. Media Revolution
At the level of disclosure, many differences between public
offerings and private placements of securities under the Act are
arguably out of date owing to easy access to an abundance of
securities information through information technology and the
globalization of the securities markets. Notwithstanding an increasing
parity between private and public offerings at the level of information
disclosure, exemptions from registration under the '33 Act remain
strictly construed. 218 For example, the '33 Act prohibits such selling
tactics as "general solicitations," making offers to non-QIBs, and
directing selling efforts in the United States-for Regulation D, Rule
144A, and Regulation S respectively. These prohibitions exist to
ensure that communications to the general public concerning
securities in unregistered private transactions are restricted so that
unqualified or ineligible purchasers do not attempt to purchase
unregistered securities which they are ineligible to purchase.
However, through the rapid increase in information technology 19
and the globalization of securities markets, publications make readily
available information on private placements; for example, even the
Wall Street Journal does not always state whether a new issue of
214. See infra Part I1I.B.
215. See infra Part III.B.1.
216. See infra Part III.B.2.
217. See infra Part III.B.3.
218. Thus the failure to establish an exemption gives purchasers a one-year "put"
against the seller. See Letter from ABA Committee on FederalRegulation of Securities
to David B.H. Martin, Division of CorporationFinance, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, RE: Securities Act Reform August 22, 2001, 1372 Practicing L.
Inst./Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook 539, 544 (May 8-9, 2003) [hereinafter Letter
from ABA Committee].
219. For example, the SEC introduced EDGAR-Electronic Data Gathering
Analysis and Retrieval System. See Cox, supra note 15, at 9.
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securities is public or private. 22' The American Bar Association
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities recognizes that
investment decisions today are typically based on multiple sources of
information, such as "sell-side and buy-side analysts, traditional and
electronic news services, ratings agencies, salespersons, etc., 221 Such
wide-ranging sources of information inform the investment decisions
of even non-institutional investors, who purchase securities in public
offerings and who are likely to be ineligible purchasers of restricted
private securities.
Indeed, today the American Bar Association
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities acknowledges that an
average "investor's decision to buy a security is [likely] not... based
on a prospectus except possibly in the case of IPOs [and] [e]ven in the
case of IPOs...
relatively few investors actually read the preliminary
222
prospectus.
Easy access to a wide range of investment information through
multiple sources is not, per se, a harmful thing for the average
investor. It stands to reason that investors' interests are best served
when information about issuers is made public.
The disclosure
requirements of the '33 Act are themselves based on precisely this
premise, and according to the American Bar Association Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities, "[i]ssuers consider themselves
under an obligation to inform their security holders about their
private transactions. '223 Issuers already risk losing exemptions from
registration in private offerings when they purposefully target, or
make information available to, investors who would not qualify to
purchase in the private offerings. For example, in a Rule 144A
placement, if such information is construed as an offer to a non-QIB,
then the issuer risks losing the 144A safe harbor. The issuer could
even be subjected to rescissionary liability under Section 12 if the
offer is deemed public because of a lost 144A exemption and the
information at issue resembles that contained in a Section 10
prospectus.
However, although investors' interests are usually well served by
information about issuers being made public, this is not an unqualified
good because the quality and objectivity of such information is not
guaranteed. For instance, the information made available to the
public by sell-side analysts 224 in recent corporate scandals such as
220. Letter from ABA Committee, supra note 218, at 544.
221. Id. at 554, 550.
222. Id.
223. Letter from ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities to David
B.H. Martin, Director Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Re: Securities Act Reform 3 (July 27, 2001) (draft copy provided by
Gerald S. Backman of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
224. Meaning a financial analyst working for a brokerage firm, whose stock
recommendations are given to customers of the brokerage firm.
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Enron and Global Crossing appears to have been unreliable, if not
deliberately misleading.22 5 One way to deal with unreliable investor
information is to broaden our understanding of the information a
prospectus contains to include "informal information ' 2 6 held out to
the public.22 7 If such informal information held out to the public
proves to be materially misleading, then the securities laws could
subject issuers to rescissionary damages under Section 12(a)(2) for a
misleading prospectus. If our understanding of a prospectus were
expanded beyond the narrow meaning it received in Gustafson to
include such things as analyst reports and term sheets, then
rescissionary liability would be available for a broader number of
offerings.
This proposal would not reverse Gustafson because it does not
address the issue of aftermarket trading 228 to which Section 12(a)(2)
liability applied pre-Gustafson. If the definition of a prospectus were
broadened beyond the narrow confines provided by Gustafson, then
any strong distinction between private and public offerings of
securities would be diminished, at least in terms of the disclosure of
information. This result would be in keeping with the way issuers
already publish information about private and public securities
information. A diminished distinction between private and public
distributions of securities would allow rescissionary liability to attach
to more offerings of securities without thereby undermining either the
securities laws or our traditional understanding of the distinction
between private and public offerings.
225. See, e.g., Charles Gasparino et al., Merrill Defends Ties to Enron Before
Congress: Yet a Veteran Analyst's Perspective on the Firms' Dealings Shows Pressure
from Major Clients, Wall St. J., July 31, 2002, at C1.
In the late 1990s Mr. Lay, the Enron Corp. chief executive, was unhappy that
Mr. Olson, then at Merrill Lynch & Co., had placed a 'neutral' rating on
Enron stock, and wanted him to upgrade his call, the analyst says. Mr.
Olson says in an interview that Mr. Lay told him he 'just didn't get it.'...
Mr. Olson offers an insider's view of the conflicts involved in the Wall Street
research process. Wall Street firms are under enormous pressure for caving
into pressure from investment bankers to publish overly optimistic ratings
on stocks in a bid to win banking business from their firms' clients.
Id.; see also Cheryl Winokur Munk et al., Merrill Changes Stock-Research Rating
Process, Wall St. J., June 10, 2002, at C16 ("In April, Mr. Spitzer obtained a court
order requiring Merrill to overhaul the way its analysts issue stock ratings on
corporate clients. How brokerage firms rate stocks and their objectivity in rating
them has been under heavy fire following the technology-stock bust and high-profile
debacles, such as Enron Corp.").
226. Informal information is not required to be disclosed pursuant to Sections 10
and 5 of the '33 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j, 77e (2000).
227. "Informal information held out to the public" means information that reaches
unsophisticated purchasers in the Ralston Purina sense. See SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
228. For an excellent law and economics-based discussion of why Section 12(a)(2)
liability should attach to aftermarket trading in spite of Gustafson and, indeed, how it
can do so without expressly overruling Gustafson, see Letsou, supra note 22.
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2. What Is in a "Prospectus"?
In addition to the traditional prospectus requirements-such as
information describing the issuer's business, selected financial data,
the type of securities offered, estimated proceeds from such securities
and the use they will be put to, as well as risk factors associated with
the offering229-a "prospectus" should be understood to include term
sheets and other informal offering materials on which investors
already rely, and which are held out to the public. A prospectus
understood broadly in this way would conform to the Section 2(10)
definition of a prospectus, including any "communication" offering or
confirming the sale of a security. 230
Indeed, such a broadly-understood prospectus is arguably
consistent with the reasoning of the Gustafson majority, which
struggled to reconcile the broad Section 2 definition of a prospectus
with the narrow Section 10 account of a prospectus in a registered
offering. 23 1 Although the Gustafson majority ultimately confined a
prospectus for 12(a)(2) purposes to Section 10, it noted that this was
consistent with the definition offered at Section 2 because that
definition "refers to documents of wide dissemination. "232 This is the
same language on which the Sloane court hung the quasi-public
argument; however, for our purposes this language is more significant
when coupled with the following: "[T]he term 'prospectus'... refer[s]
to a document soliciting the public to acquire securities from the
issuer... § 2(10) prevents a seller of stock from avoiding [12(a)(2)]
a soliciting document something other than a
liability by 23calling
3
prospectus.
This Note's proposal conforms to the Gustafson Court's conclusion
that a prospectus relates to a public offering of securities by issuers
and controlling shareholders. 2 3 Moreover, this proposal understands
"public" to be defined not merely by the prospectus requirements of
Section 10, but also by documents that solicit the public to acquire
securities from an issuer. Such documents are captured by this Note's
proposal to expand what a prospectus contains to include issuerrelated information held out to the unsophisticated investing public.
Because this proposal does not attempt to capture aftermarket sales
of securities, it is confined to issuer-based offerings of securities and
issuer-produced financial or investing information held out to the
public. As the Gustafson opinion concedes, Section 2 was intended to
prevent sellers of securities from avoiding rescissionary liability by
229. See Reicin et al., supra note 19, at 30.

230. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10).
231.
232.
233.
234.

See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 573-76 (1995).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 575-76.
See id. at 576.
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calling what is really a soliciting document something other than a
prospectus. 23 5 This proposal agrees and suggests a way to prevent
such liability avoidance by sellers.
This proposal for a broader understanding of a "prospectus" would
not replace the mandatory disclosure requirements for public
offerings that already exist in Sections 5 and 10 of the '33 Act.
However, this proposal will open some private securities
placements-by virtue of the soliciting information they hold out to
the unsophisticated investing public-to potential rescissionary
liability under Section 12(a)(2). Note that under this proposal only
issuers of private securities that open themselves up to Section
12(a)(2) liability by holding broadly understood prospectus
information out to the public will be potentially liable for
rescissionary damages.
This proposal differs from the pre-Gustafson situation insofar as it
applies neither to aftermarket transactions, nor across the board to all
private placements, whereas pre-Gustafson, Section 12(a)(2) liability
applied to both. Meanwhile, it differs from the quasi-public argument
of the Sloane court because it does not render a private securities
placement public by virtue of the number of offerees, contrary to
Ralston Purina. Instead, this proposal makes issuers of private
securities placements potentially liable under Section 12(a)(2) if, in
the course of such a placement, the issuer holds misleading or
fraudulent information out to the unsophisticated investing public.
This proposal is consistent with the Ralston Purinastandard because it
does not predicate rescissionary liability on the number of offerees.
Although this proposal uses a standard that may lack the bright-line
clarity of the Sloane court's formalistic size-of-offering solution, it
offsets any resultant ambiguity with a substantive rule that preserves
the difference between private and public offerings based on Ralston
Purina,which has itself been integrated into our complex interrelated
securities laws over the past fifty years.
3. A New Proposal for Broader Rescissionary Damages Under the
'33 Act
If the understanding of a "prospectus" for purposes of rescissionary
liability were broadened to include not just materials conforming to
Section 10, but also information held out by issuers (even in private
securities placements) to the public, some private offerings would be
subject to potential 12(a)(2) liability. However, not all private
placements will be affected in this way-only those where issuers hold
information concerning private placements out to the investing public.
This proposal coheres well with the consumer protection purposes

235. Id.
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of the '33 Act. Moreover, it should not deter good business, but
encourage issuers to control both the type of information they release
to the average unsophisticated investing public and the quality of that
information. These are both within the issuers' control. 236 Therefore,
this proposal has the benefit of predictability for the issuer, who can
anticipate whether promulgating information to the unsophisticated
investing public about a private placement will trigger potential
Section 12(a)(2) liability. Additionally, this proposal does not restore
issuers to the position they occupied before Gustafson when all public,
private, and aftermarket securities transactions across the board were
potentially liable under Section 12(a)(2). Indeed, this proposal only
aims to reinstate rescissionary damages under a broadened
understanding of a prospectus for those private placements where an
issuer has held out misleading information concerning the placement
to the unsophisticated investing public.
This proposal would trigger at least one potent antifraud provision
of the '33 Act where fraudulent information concerning private
securities placements is held out to the unsophisticated average
investor. This way, perhaps, investors would have restored to them at
least part of the consumer protection Gustafson stripped away from
the '33 Act.

236. For this reason it might not be possible to hold an issuer subject to potential
Section 12(a)(2) liability for information presented by the financial media that the
issuer did not release.
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